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Turkey Faces Political Reset After Erdogan Loses Key Cities

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  • 1. Introduction!
  • Brighter (Constellations).
  • Humanist Heroes!

Fall Volume 11, Number 4. So far, 14 out of 35 chapters have been opened and only one chapter provisionally closed. As a result, not least of the lessons learnt from the and enlargements, conditionality continues to evolve and accession becomes more difficult. Moreover, the EU remains consumed by debates about enlargement fatigue and integration capacity, particularly where Turkey is con-. Lingering hopes of progress have been further undermined by the ongoing economic crisis.

Further negativity has gained ground owing to the increased support that anti-EU and Eurosceptic parties received in the European Parliament EP elections, combined with the decreasing levels of popular support generally for European integration and further enlargement. Most recently, eyebrows have been raised by the call from Jean-Claude Juncker, the incoming Commission President, for a five-year break from enlargement.

Many informed observers of European integration and enlargement understand the reasons for frustra-. The history of European integration is a messy history of ups and downs but with the EU muddling through crises and integrating further as a result. Despite the talk of — and in some instances wishful thinking about — disintegration, the EU has responded to the Eurozone crisis with further integration and moves towards substantive banking, fiscal, and economic union.

So too does the progress towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which became possible thanks to the lure of EU membership. Moreover, Montenegro and Serbia have started accession negotiations, in June and January respectively; Albania has recently been granted candidate status; and Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have signed association agreements with the EU, an important step towards the possibility of membership. One should not be overly pessimistic about the results of the EP elections. The vote for the mainstream parties in the EP did decline and Eurosceptic parties, especially the Front National in France and the United Kingdom Independence Party, scored remarkably well.

However, despite the relative successes of Eurosceptic and far-right parties, the center-right 38 Insight Turkey. Between them, they secured They cannot be ignored, but their potential to impact significantly on the future of Europe debate can be — and has been — exaggerated, not least by those fearful of — and in some cases hoping for — disintegration. The EP elections results tell us little that we do not already know: turnout remains low What have made the headlines for Juncker in Turkey are his views on enlargement.

While pledging to continue accession negotiations with Turkey and others, Juncker has closed the door on further enlargement for the duration of the Commission. Many scenarios for the future of Europe are too pessimistic. The same cannot be said, however, for prognoses about Turkey — EU relations. Given the state of European integration, the future remains far from bright. Moreover, irrespective of the crises the EU has been experiencing, Turkey has its own particular problems that need to be addressed if it is to progress further towards EU membership.

And its reserved position on further enlargement, especially to include Turkey, is well known. Opposition to Turkish accession is particularly high in Austria, France, Germany,. Luxembourg, Greece, and Cyprus. Moreover, popular support in the EU for further enlargement is very low. In , only 37 percent of respondents across the EU expressed sup-.

Frustration and pessimism dominate the mood in Turkey about the current status of relations with the European Union and the future of accession negotiations port for more states being admitted. To Admit or Not to Admit? To Join or Not to Join? The narrative that accompanied the opening of accession negotiations — one presenting the EU as a norm-based community open to all European states, as long as the candidates align themselves with European norms and values — no longer enjoys the same prominence. On the contrary, many Summer.

Publications / Perceptions

And the accession of a formally secular but overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey is considered a threat to Europe in their imagination. For them, Christianity is an essential condition for being a member of the EU. And it has been included in all negotiating frameworks since In proposals relating to the future of the EU that foresee more differentiated and different forms and patterns of integration based around a Eurozone core, Turkey is counted at best among the potential members of the outer rings and tiers.

Against a backdrop of the Eurozone crisis in the EU, the notable success of the Turkish economy, and Turkish foreign policy achievements especially in the Middle East up until the current crisis in Syria triggered debates in Turkey on whether it could in fact dispense with the goal of EU membership. Even among some strong supporters of EU membership and opinion-makers, serious consideration has been given to how Turkey might fare on the periphery of an EU characterized by greater flexibility and more differentiated integration.

When combined with the effective stalemate in the accession negotiations and the prevailing pessimism over the prospects for accession, all this helps explain why popular support for EU.

Editor's Note | Summer , Editor's Notes İhsan Dağı | Insight Turkey

Maintaining Some Momentum The single biggest opportunity to overcome the mood of pessimism in Turkey — EU relations is resolution of the Cyprus problem. The use of the conditional is intentional; the prospects of Nicosia lifting its vetoes are not encouraging. The history of European integration is a messy history of ups and downs but with the EU muddling through crises and integrating further as a result between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece is likely to bring increased dynamism to economic and political integration in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

Here, one of the strong motivations to resolve the Cyprus issue for all parties, including the EU and the international community, is offshore gas and the discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean. However, optimism for progress in the Cyprus negotiations remains in short supply. This involves eight working groups assisting Turkey in aligning its domestic policies and legislation with key areas of the acquis communautaire. The areas covered include: visas, mobility and migration, energy, trade and the customs union, political reforms, fight against terrorism, foreign policy dialogue and participation in EU programs.

As evident from the frameworks for negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia, the cross-cutting issues of judicial and administrative capacity and in particular anti-corruption initiatives and the maintenance of the rule of law covered by these chapters have assumed a pre-eminent status in accession negotiations. Its regular reports and strategy documents have become a firm part of the annual cycle of its activities.

Moreover, it oversees an increasingly detailed accession process. However, enlargement is far from being high on the agenda of the incoming Commission. Its priorities of the economy, trade, and energy are nevertheless understandable given challenges the EU is currently facing. During the next five years, enlargement will not, however, be completely off the agenda. Indeed, the pause in enlargement that Juncker has called for was likely anyway.

With Iceland having effectively suspended its membership bid, no candidate is going to be in a position to accede to the EU in the next five years: all are at best in the early stages of substantive negotiations, negotiations which, following the Croatian example, are likely to take at least five or six years, and after that two years are likely to be required to secure ratification of the accession treaty. The pause relates to the admission of states not the progress towards enlargement. Moreover, his criticism of the Twitter ban is widely shared among EU institutions and in the member states.

Treating Juncker as if he were a new Sarkozy is to exaggerate what he has said and misunderstand the dynamics of enlargement. First, there is the issue of communication. Turkey, with the support of EU member states and the Commission, needs to increase its efforts to inform public opinion in the EU about Turkey and the potential contribution of its membership to the EU.

However, decreasing public support for EU membership in Turkey and ill-informed assertions about the disintegration of the EU show that communication is not only about Turkey promoting itself within the EU. The EU has an image problem in candidate countries. But this is not enough. The EU Delegation in Turkey and EU member state embassies also have to increase their efforts to inform Turkish public opinion about the dynamics of European integration and the procedural and technical realities of Summer. Special efforts are needed to deal with criticisms over the alleged unfairness of the accession process and the perceived lack of equal treatment of Turkey.

On the EU side, however, Turkey should be included in debates and discussions over the future shape and design of European integration, just as it was during the European Convention in that inspired many of the reforms ultimately contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. Assuming the commitment to EU norms and values can be demonstrated, the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey alongside the leaders of other candidates and potential candidate countries should be invited to at least gatherings in the margins of key EU meetings and included in EU family photos, as was generally the case with candidates in the lead-up to eastern enlargement.

A second issue is commitment: Turkey should renew its commitment to EU membership. In the s and s, Turkey was criticized for human rights issues. Considering the current issues in Turkey and evolving demands and priorities of EU conditionality, it is for sure that promotion of the rule of law and the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives and judicial reform will become prominent themes in the accession negotiations. Therefore, greater impetus should be given to the adoption and implementation of reforms in these areas.

Turkey want to be a member of the EU? Geopolitics and security considerations do matter. Equally, when it comes to accession negotiations, commitment and the adoption and implementation of reforms in all the acquis chapters is of paramount importance. Just focusing on the security dimension of the relationship is likely to end in something short of membership. The single biggest opportunity to overcome the mood of pessimism in Turkey — EU relations is resolution of the Cyprus problem could be an inspiration here.

Thirdly, it is often suggested that the EU should offer Turkey a clear ac-. The th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey — — is rich in symbolic importance and arguably a realistic target. Setting the year as a target to transform Turkey to an EU-ready country could act as a catalyst for reform. Here quick comparisons can be made with eastern enlargement, especially with Romania and Bulgaria. Only when negotiations had been concluded in December did the EU declare 1 May as the accession date for its first eastern enlargement. At the same time, the European Council declared its objective to welcome Romania and Bulgaria in Again the date was conditional on the accession criteria being met.

Subsequent references to January entry remained conditional, and it was only in December , once negotiations had been closed, that the date was fixed. Evidently, if and when the EU signals a date, it remains conditional. It is not a promise and dates are only set once accession negotiations are concluded.

Precedent dictates this. It should also be noted that its historical importance for the post-Cold War unification of Europe meant that eastern enlargement was essentially an irreversible process. This is far less the case for Turkey and the others in the queue for membership. Eurobarometer 80 Autumn , QA. Eurobarometer 80, op. QA7a 7. Washington miscalculated the diplomatic skills of Brazil and Turkey and their ability to take on diplomatic challenges usually reserved for the great powers.

Fastforward three years, and suddenly diplomacy with Iran was embraced by Washington. Why did the same American administration that rejected the Turkish brokered deal in , shift in favor of diplomacy in ? This essay sheds light on some of the factors that rendered the nuclear standoff with Iran ripe for a diplomatic solution. Only 8 months earlier, the same government in Tehran had rejected a similar deal in negotiations with the U. Three years later, the U. But why did diplomacy succeed in.

Why did the same American administration, that rejected the Turkish brokered deal in , shift in favor of diplomacy in ? This essay will shed light on some of the factors that rendered the nuclear standoff with Iran ripe for a diplomatic solution. But at the last moment, Washington miscalculated the diplomatic skills.

On May 15, , Lula da Silva traveled to Iran with an entourage of some three hundred Brazilian businessmen. Contrary to expectations, and arguably to the hopes of some, they succeeded in convincing the Iranian government to agree to a deal based on the American benchmarks, where 1, kilograms of Iranian LEU would be sent out in one shipment and Iran would receive fuel pads for its Tehran Research Reactor roughly twelve months later. For a moment, it looked as if diplomacy had succeeded after all. But what could have been viewed as a diplomatic breakthrough — with Iran blinking first and succumbing to American demands — was instead treated as an effort to sabotage the new and higher objective of imposing sanctions.

Obama also presented a compromise mechanism that the U. The letter also included a formal point that Iran should send its reply to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA in writing within seven days rather than to any individual state. Tehran Yields The discussions in Tehran were exasperating. However, Iran made a concession toward the end of the first day of talks: it expressed a willingness to escrow its LEU in Turkey.

Furthermore, as the parties were ready to break for the day, another hopeful sign emerged: the Iranians wanted to resume the discussions at a. The Turks and Brazilians had succeeded in convincing Iran to hand over 1, kilograms of LEU in one shipment in order to receive fuel pads for its research reactor within the next twelve months — the same parameters Tehran had rejected eight months earlier in Vienna. Against all odds, Turkey and Brazil, in a few months of intensive diplomacy, had achieved what Western powers had failed to do in several years. Amorim proudly announced that the agreement accomplished all Summer.

Unbeknownst to Turkey and Brazil, the Obama administration had secured final approval for a sanctions resolution from Russia and China only a day before the talks in Tehran began. Two days after the deal was struck, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sounded the death. The choice of venue was not a coincidence. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts un-. Recognizing the political risk that diplomacy with Iran would entail, the Obama team hedged its bets by arguing that the mere attempt at diplomacy would make it easier to mobilize international backing for sanctions if diplomacy failed.

With its diplomatic outreach having done just that, the administration felt that it had to at least deliver on sanctions in order to justify the gamble on diplomacy. Second, the heavy investment in the sanctions process helped turn the matter into one of prestige.

Not imposing sanctions would have been hailed as a victory by Iran and condemned by Israel and its allies in the U. These agreements, primarily between the U. They were contingent upon Russian support for a sanctions resolution. If sanctions were sidelined by diplomacy, not only could the deals be jeopardized, but, in case the Tehran Declaration fell apart down the road, the sanctions process would start anew and all the deals and arrangements would have to be renegotiated. The political maneuverability that Obama enjoyed on Iran when he first took office had been completely eaten away by pressure from Israel and Congress Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the Obama administration believed it had simply run out of political space domestically to accept the Tehran Declaration.

Congress was coming at the Obama administration like a steamroller and the White House did not believe that investing capital in expanding the political space for the deal would be a politically wise move. Obama had essentially made two promises: one to Brazil and Turkey through his letter to their leaders, and one to Congress that they would get their sanctions on Iran. With only six months until mid-term elections, he was not going to antagonize Congress.

Therefore, he decided to reject Brazil and Turkey instead. Tide Turns in Favor of Diplomacy Four years after the debacle over the Tehran Declaration, Obama has found renewed determination for diplomacy and has even accepted the considerable domestic political cost for pursuing it. How did this stunning turnaround come about? First, there has been a significant geopolitical shift in the region that simply rendered the continuation of the U. Iran enmity too costly.

Regionally, the strategic interest of the U. Washington seeks a nuclear accord with Tehran to avoid both a nuclear Iran and war with Iran. On the regional balance of power, Martin Kramer, a fellow at the conservative Israeli Shalem Center,. In spite of a major campaign defaming Hagel, even accusing him of anti-Semitism, his nomination won approval in the Senate. AIPAC announced that it would send hundreds of citizen lobbyists to the Hill to help secure approval for the authorization of the use of force.

The American people quickly mobilized and ferociously opposed the idea of yet another war in the Middle East. The third defeat was over new sanctions against Iran. The interim nuclear agreement from November of last year explicitly stated that no additional sanctions could be imposed. The White House strongly disagreed, fearing that new sanctions would cause the collapse of diplomacy and make America look like the intransigent party. The international coalition the president had carefully put together against Iran would fall apart, and the U.

Its immense lobbying activities secured 59 cosponsors for the bill, including 16 Democrats. Supporters of diplomacy put up an impressive defense of the negotiations, building both off of years of careful development of a pro-diplomacy constituency and coalition Summer. Eventually, AIPAC threw in the towel and announced that it would no longer push for a vote on the bill. The very same forces that Obama did not dare challenge in were now defeated by his administration.

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The shifting political landscape in Washington was also seen in the debacle over Syria. As Obama sought support from Congress for an attack on Syria in August , the public ferociously resisted, flooding Congress with phone calls. Their threats proved effective. This dramatically changed the landscape because it showed that the politically safe position was not to be hawkish and pro-war, but to be skeptical of military action and favorable towards diplomacy.

Once Rouhani was elected and the White House concluded that he was serious and committed to diplomacy, the U. He did so partly because it was the right thing to do for U. There is no other issue in the Middle East that has as high of a likelihood of being solved. With Iran, unlike Syria, Egypt and elsewhere in the region, the U. If the parties reach a final, comprehensive deal, this will undoubtedly be a game-changer in the region.

However, it will also come about to some extent because both the region and the political dynamics in Washington have already changed. This article examines this purported crisis of religious pluralism in Europe and argues that while it is often depicted as resulting from the particularities of Islamic culture and theology, recent controversies point to a deeper crisis born of a historical failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects.

From controversies regarding the permissibility of religious clothing and symbols in the public sphere, to those related to limits on religious speech and speech that may offend religious sensibilities, and to those concerning the accommodation of religious practices, much of this questioning has concerned issues related to the migration of Muslims to Europe. For many, on both the right and the left, these controversies reveal a failure of religious pluralism in the face of a.

In this way, the crisis of religious pluralism appears to be rooted in an incommensurability of Islam and European society. Consequently, solutions to the crisis must be found in measures responding to the presence, and governing the practices of Muslim subjects. Below, I will discuss the purported crisis of religious pluralism in Europe and argue that while it is often depicted as a result of the particularities of Islamic culture and theology, recent controversies point to a deeper crisis born of an historical failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects.

Islam and the Crisis of Religious Pluralism Since the early s, the notion that Europe is in the midst of a crisis has been a growing refrain. This has been articulated as a crisis of a secular-democratic European society and the values that it is said to both promote and reflect. Within this discourse of a crisis of religious pluralism, the foremost concern is an ostensible incommensurability of Islam and secular, democratic society. This concern is articulated in two related ways. The first identifies elements of Islamic theology that are said to be directly incompatible with secular society.

The second points to a variety of social and political problems found in regions with majority Muslim populations and attributes these to Islam. Of these problems, the most routinely mentioned are those related to: a patriarchal gender relations, such as gender segregation, sexual violence, honor killings and female genital mutilation; b the mistreatment of religious and sexual minorities — pointing to discrimination, violence and the lack of legal rights and protections for these groups; c a lack of respect for freedom of expression — as epitomized by the protests and violent reactions to the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in , and the release of films critical of Islam, such as The Innocence of Muslims in and the film Submission, whose director, Theo Van Gogh, was later murdered; and d a lack of democracy in the Muslim world, both historically and in the contemporary times.

These events, practices and interpretations of theology are said to be demonstrative of the essential incommensurability of Islam and secular democracy and, consequently, of the incompatibility of Muslims with European society. In this discourse of incommensurability, the above-mentioned problematic practices and attitudes are depicted as being rooted in the teachings,.

As such, they are not seen as spatially limited to Muslim societies. Instead, they are attributed to all Muslim subjects. Said to be rooted in Islamic values, these practices and attitudes are assumed to be held by all who adhere to Islam. Given this deterministic and essentialist understanding of Islam and the Muslim subject, the phenomenon of migration becomes particularly troubling. The focus of contemporary European debates about the nature, value and limits of religious pluralism is related to issues regarding Muslim immigration elimination of institutional accommodation for religious practices, a cessation of Muslim immigration and even the deportation of Muslims already residing in Europe.

Such sentiments are not only present on the fringes of European politics. Moreover, similar ideas are often advocated by traditionally mainstream political actors. Within mainstream political discourse, the threat of Muslim immigration is generally presented as an issue of social cohesion. Articulated in this way, the main challenge posed by migration is one of integration, seen as an exceptionally arduous undertaking given the aforementioned understanding of the nature of Islamic theology and society, and the deterministic and essentialist understanding of Muslim subjectivity.

Muslims, defined by an essential and unalterable religiosity, are understood to pose a particular Summer. People who join to the march after the call from the Vaucluse Multicultural Federation of France to show their anger against the racist discourses and a swastika which is drawn on the wall of the Sorgues mosque on 13rd of February.

February 20, The primary concern with regard to governance relates to the previously mentioned view that Islam does not recognize a division of religious and secular authority or identity. The apparent absence of social differentiation is deemed problematic because it is said to permit the dominance of religious authority and identity in the public sphere. This often-repeated interpretation of Islamic theology has led to a questioning of whether religious authority will always override secular authority for Muslims.

In other words, mainstream European political discourse reveals reservations regarding the willingness of Muslims to abide by laws that conflict with religious teachings and com-. In debates concerning recent controversies related to religious pluralism, Muslims have been depicted as unwilling to abide by state regulations concerning appearance, freedom of expression, gender relations and violence against women.

Moreover, the loyalty of Muslims to a particular nation or state is often seen as compromised by a primary allegiance to the supra-national Ummah. Such apprehension regarding the ability of Muslim migrants to integrate into European society is apparent in various measures concerning migration that have recently been. In the past decade, several European states have altered requirements for attaining residency and citizenship. Ministry introduced a citizenship test that requires candidates to demonstrate proficiency in the French language equal to that of a year old native speaker, as well as sufficient knowledge of French history, culture and Republican values.

This statement was widely seen as specifically aimed at Muslims, who constitute a majority of new French citizens each year. It is a decision that requires a lot of thought. Perhaps the most renowned of the recently instituted measures concerning the integration of migrants in Europe is the Dutch civic integration exam, which has been obligatory for all potential migrants since The aspect of this examination that has attracted the most attention is a two-hour long film that potential migrants are required to purchase and view, entitled Coming to the Netherlands.

This film, which critics have argued is designed to offend and exclude devout Muslims,13 contains images of public nudity and two men kissing in a park. The inclusion of these scenes, depicting practices ostensibly common and universally accepted in the Netherlands, is meant to demonstrate to potential migrants the importance of tolerance, as well as to gauge their willingness and ability to integrate into what is considered liberal Dutch society.

These changes to immigration practices, like those in France and the United Kingdom, reveal an anxiety concerning integration and a resultant need to demonstrate to migrants that they must put aside, or at least temper, their religious beliefs, practices and loyalties in order to be welcomed into secular, democratic European societies. Such measures are responses to the belief, prevalent since at least the early s, that Europe is experiencing a crisis of religious pluralism.

For both proponents of the Islamization thesis and more mainstream figures, it is the phenomenon of Muslim immigration and a belief in the incommensurability of Islam and European secular-democratic society that have necessitated a questioning of the value, nature and limits of pluralism and toleration. In this sense, the crisis is 60 Insight Turkey. Of principal concern are two related issues: a whether the primary loyalty of Muslim immigrants lies with the nation-state or the globally-dispersed Muslim community; and b whether Muslims will, in the case of conflict, follow the dictates of religious or secular authority.

Loyalty, Obedience and the Perennial Threat of Religious Difference While the discourse outlined above attributes the crisis of religious pluralism to the particularities of Islam, the perceived threat to governance posed by the presence of religious differences within a political community has been a topic of recurrent consideration throughout European history. Moreover, the concerns about loyalty and obedience that ani-.

As such, the current crisis of religious pluralism should be seen as the contemporary materialization of a deeper crisis of governance resulting from a failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects. Since antiquity, there have been ongoing attempts to manage the threat of the presence of religious differences within the political community.

Within the empires of ancient Greece and Rome, comprised of followers of various religions, the divine mandate of the state required the worship of the official gods of the state. Failure to engage in such worship was viewed as a sign of disloyalty. However, the syncretism of ancient Greek and Roman polytheism served as a form of religious pluralism, permitting the followers of diverse religions to worship their traditional gods, while simultaneously paying tribute to the gods of the official pantheon. This was made possible by the equation of the gods of other religions with those of the official pantheon or, at times, the incorporation of a new god.

The limits to this form of proto-pluralism appeared in the form of atheism, which rejected the worship of deities, and, in the case of the Roman Empire, monotheistic religions particularly Christianity and Judaism , which prohibited their followers from participating in the polytheistic state religion. Within the Roman Empire, both Christians and Jews faced severe persecution, including restrictions or.

Muslims, defined by an essential and unalterable religiosity, are understood to pose a particular challenge for social cohesion due to their inability or unwillingness to integrate into secular European society at times outright prohibition of worship and proselytization. As in the case of Islam in Europe today, the measures enacted against Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire were reflective of anxieties related to their loyalty and obedience.

The primary loyalty of these groups was seen as residing with their religious community, rather than the Empire. Moreover, owing to their rejection of the divinity of Imperial power and the eschatological aspects of their theologies, the obedience of Christians and Jews to Imperial rather than religious authority was always in doubt. The legalization of Christianity in the Edict of Milan and its eventual establishment as the official religion of the Roman Empire by Theodosius I in did not, however, introduce an era of religious pluralism.

Rather, the persecution of Jews and Christian sects deemed heretical increased and in , all pagan cult worship was prohibited. With the Protestant Reformation, religious difference once again emerged Summer. The loyalty of Muslims to a particular nation or state is often seen as compromised by a primary allegiance to the supra-national Ummah as an issue of governance in Europe. Despite being banned in , Lutheranism was rapidly gaining adherents by the middle of the 16th century, including a number of Princes within the Holy Roman Empire.

In order to contend with this problem, the doctrine of cuius regio, euis religio whose realm, whose religion was developed. With the inclusion of the ius reformadi right to reform in the Peace of Augsburg of , rulers were permitted to enforce religious uniformity within their principality. Individuals living in a territory whose leader belonged to a denomination other than their own were also guaranteed the right to emigrate. However, the extent of interstate pluralism permitted by this solution was limited, as only Catholicism and Lutheranism were recognized as state religions.

The signing of the Treaties of Westphalia in marked the official end of this system and the emergence of new challenges related to religious 62 Insight Turkey. By abrogating the ius reformadi and guaranteeing certain rights to Christians living in territories where their denomination was not the established church, the Peace of Westphalia introduced the religious minority as a legal subject. With the recognition of religious minorities in law, a new problem arose for the state: namely, how to govern these subjects. Rulers could no longer legally resort to traditional policies of annihilation, forced conversion or expulsion.

The legal acceptance of religious minorities led to a renewal of anxieties concerning loyalty and obedience to the ruler, leading, at times, to open conflict or the violent suppression of minorities. Thus, the Peace of Westphalia failed to offer a model of governance capable of resolving such issues without periodically resorting to policies aiming to restrict or eliminate religious differences. Since the emergence of liberal constitutionalism, questions regarding the governance of religious minorities have been complicated, as the right to religious difference is viewed as inalienable.

Consequently, the governance of religious difference cannot take the form of an explicit exclusion of followers of particular religions. Nor, however, can this issue be ignored, given the threat it could pose to social and political cohesion. The task of democratic political philosophy, consequently, has been to formulate systems of governance through which the risks that religious differences pose to the nation-state can be managed without illegitimately constraining freedom of religion. Two models of governance have emerged to contend with this dilemma.

According to Locke, the problem of the loyalty and obedience of religious subjects is not simply the result of the presence of followers of different sects within the same political territory; rather, it is due to a lack of clearly demarcated and differentiated civil and religious jurisdictions.

Moreover, if particular religious practices had secular consequences, he declared that intervention would be justified and appropriate.